A multiple-market framework is developed to measure the size and distribution of research benefits. The model considers an upstream raw product market and a downstream finished product market and allows for imperfect competition in the intermediary food-processing sector. A central conceptual result is derived: an increase in raw product output is a sufficient condition for costreducing innovations in the farm sector to increase social welfare. A special case of linear farm supply and isoelastic processing production functions reveals that necessary conditions for welfare to decrease are a convergent farm supply shift, an oligopsonistic upstream market configuration, and increasing returns-to-scale processing technology. The studies to date on research benefits in imperfectly competitive markets have generally specified the effects of public research with parallel or proportional shifts in farm supply. The remaining possibility, that of convergent shifts, is an interesting omission in the literature. Convergent shifts, which make the farm supply function more inelastic, have been considered previously by Lindner and Jarrett in the competitive case; however, supply shifts that increase the slope of the farm supply relation have particularly profound implications under oligopsony.
Other economists have noted that downward shifts in farm supply can reduce raw product use and increase farm prices in oligopsonistic industries. In particular, Chen and Lent find that an increase in the slope of the farm supply function is a necessary condition for a downward farm supply shift to reduce industry output. Hamilton and Sunding derive a similar result for convergent supply shifts in long-run oligopsony equilibria and detail how farm innovation can affect downstream concentration and market power. Our analysis extends this research, while recasting some of its major insights, by considering a more general theoretic framework and addressing the social welfare implications of convergent shifts in farm supply.
This article develops a framework for the measurement of research benefits that is more general than other analyses in the literature to date. We consider three extensions simultaneously: (i) a wider variety of farm supply shifts, (ii) a general specification of demand and farm cost functions, and (iii) a nondegenerate food processing production function that allows for various parameterizations of returns to scale. The analysis leads to several fundamental observations regarding the marginal welfare impacts of cost-reducing farm investments. When all markets are perfectly competitive, we show that a reduction in the cost of producing the status quo level of farm output is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for an increase in social welfare. Under conditions of imperfect competition, however, we uncover a result that underscores the importance of downstream market structure: Social welfare can decrease even when innovation reduces the cost of producing the status quo level of farm output. We demonstrate that welfare can decrease in response to innovation that lowers farm production costs only if the farm supply shift is convergent and the upstream raw product market is characterized by oligopsony. Conversely, we also show that an increase in farm output is a sufficient condition for a cost-reducing farm supply shift to increase social welfare.
In the final section, the general results of the model are made more transparent by considering a special case of linear farm supply and isoelastic processing production technology. Another necessary condition emerges for public research to reduce social welfare in this case: the food processing technology must exhibit increasing returns to scale. Thus, the three modifications made here to the more usual methods of evaluating research benefits provide a significant conceptual payoff.
The Model
Consider an agricultural economy consisting of a raw product market and a finished product market. The model is comprised of three types of agents (farmers, processors, and consumers) and two markets (a raw product market among farmers and processors and a finished product market among processors and consumers).
The processing industry is comprised of n firms. The raw product use of processor i is denoted xi and the total raw product use in the industry is X = (10), whereas, in noncompetitive environments, the price of the farm product is less than the value of its marginal product in inverse proportion to the value of ).
In general, analytic solutions to equation (9) are not possible. The effect of an arbitrary farm supply shift on the market equilibrium is therefore described using the implicit function theorem. Differentiating first-order condition (9) with respect to x, we have The derivative of equation (9) with respect to 0 is =x -(Wo + oXWxo). Thus, in a market without oligopsony power, public research affects the first-order condition of a representative processor solely through the level effect in the farm supply function, W0, which corresponds, in the short run, to the change in the marginal cost of farming. In a noncompetitive raw product market, public investment also affects first-order condition (9) through the rotation effect, Wxo, or through changes in the slope of the farm supply function. In the terminology of Lindner and Jarrett, the rotational effect of a downward shift is "convergent" when Wxo > 0, and it is "divergent" in the opposite case.5 The most com- At the initial level of output, the marginal change in the farm price is Wx,, while the average change in the farm price is Wo/X. Thus, the shift elasticity is the ratio of changes in the average and marginal farm price at the initial equilibrium point. If public research reduces the equilibrium farm price (i.e., W. < 0), the shift elasticity is positive for divergent shifts but negative for convergent shifts in farm supply. Farm output can decrease in response to public research only when the shift elasticity is negative. In expression (13), farm output increases in response to a parallel or divergent shift in farm supply, regardless of the form of competition, but decreases in response to a convergent shift if \jE < o.6 In the next section, our discussion reveals that the shift elasticity, or, more precisely, the sign of the rotation effect, Wxo, provides a relevant focus for the empirical investigation of research benefits in noncompetitive food processing environments.
Sectoral Impacts of Public Research
In this section, we describe the effect of an arbitrary farm supply shift on farm surplus, processor surplus, and consumer surplus under various industry configurations in the processing sector. We first analyze the effect of public research on farm surplus and, in particular, on changes in the total cost of farming associated with agricultural innovation.
At the initial equilibrium point, the total variable cost of farm production is The first term after the equality in equation (15) is the change in production costs associated with the change in output, while the integral represents the change in the cost of producing the status quo level of output. That is, the integrand gives the distance between the initial and postresearch farm supply curves. Given that the intent of public research is to lower farm production costs, we confine attention to the case where the integral in equation (15) has a negative value, thereby eliminating from consideration public investments that increase the total cost of producing the status quo level of output.7 Even with such a restriction, the effect of public research on farm production costs is potentially ambiguous: the cost of producing the ex ante output level declines but more units may be produced ex post.
In the empirical examination of research benefits, perhaps the greatest challenge is to measure the change in production costs along the entire length of the initial supply curve. In principle, this change is measurable if the functional form of the farm supply curve and the type of shift are known. Alternatively, it is also possible to estimate the change in the supply relation nonparametrically, using the microparameter method described by Sunding.8
We For a divergent shift, the value of W0 is greater at the equilibrium point than at lower output levels, which implies that the sum of the last two terms in equation (16) (16) implies that a necessary condition for farm surplus to decrease is that the farm supply shift is divergent, a familiar result to studies that specify proportional farm supply shifts in the measurement of research benefits. 
Processor surplus is defined as PS(0) P[Y(O)]Y(0) -W(X; O)X(O). Differentiation
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In response to public innovation, social benefit increases in equation (19) following an expansion of raw product use and a decrease in the status quo costs of farm production. In a competitive food processing environment, the marginal value product of farm output equals the raw product price by first-order condition (9), which implies that the change in social benefit is equal to the reduction in total farm production costs at the initial equilibrium point. Thus, under conditions of perfect competition, a reduction in farm production costs at the initial equilibrium point is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for public research to increase social benefit.10 When the processing sector is imperfectly competitive, equation ( where dO < 0 for a downward shift. Each of these functions precludes the possibility that Wxo > 0, and thus rule out, a priori, the type of effects that result from convergent shifts; these include a potential contraction of industry output and a concomitant decrease in social welfare.
Lindner and Jarrett and others have recognized the potential for public research to induce convergent farm supply shifts. The types of innovations most likely to result in convergent shifts are those that lower the costs of producing the status quo level of farm out-'o This result also appears in Sunding. put but increase the share of fixed costs in the crop budget. These changes reduce farm costs while simultaneously making the farm supply function less elastic. Indeed, one of the most celebrated analyses of research benefits alludes to just such an outcome. In their 1970 analysis of research benefits for the mechanical tomato harvester in California, Schmitz and Seckler find that adoption of the harvester reduced harvest labor requirements and variable production costs while increasing fixed costs. Subsequently, Just and Chern concluded that the adoption of the tomato harvester made the farm supply relation more inelastic and, hence, resulted in a convergent shift."
The Case of Linear Supply and Isoelastic Production Technology
The methodological approach we have outlined employs general specifications of supply, demand, and processor production relationships. A special case of this framework, therefore, is the linear economy with fixed proportions processing technology pursued by Alston, Sexton, and Zhang. In this section, we present a special case that extends their analysis but which leads to quite different conclusions. In particular, we follow Alston, Sexton, and Zhang by specifying a linear farm supply curve but consider a more general, isoelastic food production technology. We also maintain a more general demand function, though this difference is of little import. The implication of the special case is that alternative specifications of the downstream production technology produce results that are fundamentally different from the case of fixed proportions, which clarifies an important and heretofore unrecognized role of scale economies in the processing sector. The results underscore our earlier observation that the relationship between farm supply shifts and research returns is considerably richer than previously recognized.
For analytic convenience, we consider a linear farm supply function and confine attention to the case of a competitive down- where the denominator is negative by equation (24). In a competitive environment, equation (27) reduces to dSB/dO = -X(bo + eoX/ 2), which is positive for a cost-decreasing farm supply shift, as in the general model. It follows directly that public research reduces social benefit only in the case of an upstream oligopsony configuration and a convergent farm supply shift.
Evaluating equation ( Noting that o -1, it follows immediately that the right-hand side of equation (29) is (at least weakly) positive. Therefore, necessary conditions for a convergent farm supply shift to reduce social benefits are o > 0 and xa(lql)> 1. The implication of the special case is that a convergent farm supply shift can reduce social welfare only when the processing technology satisfies a > 1, which corresponds to a situation of increasing returns to scale in the food processing industry. Moreover, the range of circumstances in which public research yields negative social returns increases with the value of a. This finding highlights the potential quantitative and qualitative bias in the calculation of social benefits when a degenerate processing production function is specified in food processing environments that are not, in fact, characterized by constant returns to scale.
Conclusion
This article develops a general framework for calculating of the size and distribution of research benefits. The framework distinguishes between the farm product and final product markets with a processing production function, employs general supply and demand functions, and considers broad classes of farm supply shifts.
The results reinforce the importance of assumptions about competitive conditions and the specification of supply shifts when measuring the size and distribution of research benefits. In particular, when the downstream processing industry is imperfectly competitive, the welfare implications of cost-reducing innovation are sensitive to changes in the slope of the farm supply relation. Public investment that lowers the total cost of farming always increases aggregate welfare under perfect competition but may actually reduce welfare for convergent shifts when the downstream food processing industry is imperfectly competitive. The nature of food processing technology is also important. A special case of the model reveals that necessary conditions for public research to result in perverse welfare changes is an oligopsony upstream market configuration and increasing returns to scale in the processing industry. The potential for substantial scale economies in the highly concentrated food processing sector favors the implementation of more general farm supply shifts and more flexible processor production relationships in future analyses of research benefits.
